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COMMITMENT THROUGH FEAR: MANDATORY JURY 
TRIALS AND SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS VIOLATIONS IN THE 
CIVIL COMMITMENT OF SEX OFFENDERS IN ILLINOIS
MICHAEL ZOLFO*
INTRODUCTION
Taking a person’s liberty is one of the most consequential decisions in 
the American judicial system. The U.S. Constitution contains a number of 
protections that ensure individuals are treated fairly and equally before they 
can lose their liberty. The most prominent of these protections is the Fifth 
Amendment, which states “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law.”1 A government must provide a 
person with both substantial and procedural due process before they can 
lose their liberty and are confined by the state.
In Rushville, Illinois, there is a detention facility where 562 members 
of society are confined, many indefinitely. They are not confined because 
they were convicted of a crime and are being punished. They are not 
confined to serve as an example and deter others from crime. Rather, they 
are confined because they have been deemed too dangerous to live freely in 
society. These individuals are sex offenders, individuals who are often 
considered “the worst of the worst” of humanity.2 Sex offenders are not a 
group of people who engender much sympathy or advocacy. However, the 
U.S. Constitution states that before a government can make the drastic 
choice of taking a person’s liberty, possibly for the rest of their lives, there 
are a number of protections and procedures that must be followed. It is the 
purpose of this Note to demonstrate that in Illinois, civilly-committed sex 
offenders are not afforded their due process rights under the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution because they are given 
*J.D., Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2018. Executive Notes and Comments Editor, Chicago-Kent Law 
Review. The author would like to thank Daniel P. Coyne, Matthew M. Daniels, and the Law Offices of 
Chicago-Kent College of Law for their assistance and guidance in the research and writing of this Note.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Chris Serres, Minnesota Sex Offenders: Are They Really the ‘Worst of the Worst?’,
MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB. (Dec. 2, 2013, 10:38 AM), http://www.startribune.com/minnesota-sex-
offenders-are-they-really-the-worst-of-the-worst/233945281/ [https://perma.cc/2GTB-FTP3].
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the illusion that they have a right to a bench trial, but are then subjected to 
jury trials against their wishes.
The American public expects government protection from sex 
offenders and those who commit sexually violent crimes.3 The nature of 
sexually violent crimes often cause the crime, the offender, and the victim 
to receive a large amount of media attention, often in a sensational 
manner.4 As a result, when a sexually violent crime occurs, the intense 
media coverage only increases societal fear of sex offenders.5 In response 
to public fear and concern over sex offenders and sexually violent crimes, 
the U.S. government and many state governments have used a variety of 
tactics to both remove sex offenders from the streets and to better 
understand the motives of offenders.6 Beginning as early as the 1930s, in 
the midst of a nationwide panic over sex offenders, many states attempted 
to calm the hysteria by passing “sexual psychopath” legislation to keep sex 
offenders under state control.7 As the twentieth century progressed, public
fear of sex offenders declined.8 However, the rise of newer forms of media, 
such as cable news and reality crime shows, initiated a second nationwide 
panic over sex offenders and sexually violent crimes in the 1980s and 
1990s.9 This led to a flurry of new legislation at both the federal and state 
level designed to register, monitor, and control sex offenders, including a 
new tactic: civil commitment of sex offenders.10
As of October 2016, the federal government and twenty states, 
including Illinois, have enacted civil commitment laws for sex offenders.11
The Illinois Sexually Violent Persons (“SVP”) Commitment Act became 
effective on January 1, 1998, and was a response to concerns over sex 
offenders being released into the public after serving their criminal 
sentences with the Illinois Department of Corrections.12 The Illinois SVP 
Commitment Act, much like the federal program and those in other states, 
3. Jennifer K. Anderson & Joanna Woolman, Going Against the Grain of the Status Quo: 
Hopeful Reformations to Sex Offender Civil Commitment in Minnesota—Karsjens v. Jesson, 42 
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1363, 1366 (2016).
4. Id. at 1377.
5. Id. at 1380.
6. Id. at 1372.
7. Id. at 1374.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1374–75.
10. Id. at 1375; Christina Mancini & Daniel P. Mears, Criminology: U.S. Supreme Court 
Decisions and Sex Offender Legislation: Evidence of Evidence-Based Policy?, 103 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1115, 1122 (2013).
11. Anderson & Woolman, supra note 3, at 1374.
12. See generally Sexually Violent Persons Commitment Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1–99 
(2016).
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aims to commit sex offenders into government custody after they have 
completed their criminal sentences, and aims to provide treatment until 
they are no longer dangerous.13 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of state sex offender civil commitment statutes in Kansas 
v. Hendricks, and upheld the constitutionality of the federal sex offender 
civil commitment in United States v. Comstock.14 The Supreme Court held 
that so long as these programs are used for treatment purposes, and not as a 
way to further punish sex offenders, the programs are constitutional.15
However, two recent decisions in the Eighth Circuit and the Eastern 
District of Missouri have reexamined the constitutionality of sex offender 
civil commitment, and have particularly focused on the proper level of 
scrutiny courts should apply to Due Process Clause challenges by 
committed sex offenders.16
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate that the Illinois SVP 
Commitment Act violates the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Fifth 
Amendment declares that “[n]o person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, 
or property without due process of law.”17 The Illinois SVP Commitment 
Act’s provisions that allow the prosecutors to demand a jury trial violates 
SVP respondents’ due process rights. The jury trial provisions in the 
Illinois SVP Commitment Act results in offenders losing their liberty even 
though they do not pose a threat to society.
Part I of this Note will discuss the evolution and implementation of 
the Illinois SVP Commitment Act, and will specifically examine the 
sections that allow for the State to request a jury trial. Part II will examine
the due process concerns that federal courts have raised when examining 
SVP statutes, and demonstrate how the Illinois SVP Commitment Act 
violates the due process rights of SVP respondents. Part III will examine 
the likelihood of success for legislative and judicial solutions to remedy the 
Due Process Clause violations that occur under the Illinois SVP 
Commitment Act.
13. Id. 207/40.
14. Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 
131 (2010). 
15. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 350; Comstock, 560 U.S. at 131.
16. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 411 (8th Cir. 2017); Van Orden v. Stringer, 262 F. Supp. 3d. 
887 (E.D. Mo. 2017) (The Eastern District of Missouri reevaluated its decision in Van Orden v. Schafer,
129 F. Supp. 3d 839 (E.D. Mo. 2015), in light of the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Karsjens v. Piper, and 
reversed its earlier decision finding the Missouri Sex Offender Rehabilitation and Treatment Services 
Program as unconstitutional as applied. The petitioners have filed an appeal to the Eighth Circuit, which 
is still pending.).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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I. ILLINOIS SVP COMMITMENT ACT AND STATE RIGHT TO JURY TRIAL
The Illinois SVP Commitment Act was passed in 1997.18 Illinois is 
one of seventeen states that passed SVP commitment laws between 1993 
and 2005.19 These laws emerged during a time when public awareness and 
fear of violent criminals such as sex offenders was on the rise.20 The 
Illinois SVP Commitment Act was passed against this backdrop of 
heightened public attention to sexually violent crimes.21 The following 
sections will examine the general constitutional requirements of an SVP 
program in order to better understand the rationale, terminology, and 
processes present in the Illinois SVP Commitment Act. The specifics of the 
Illinois SVP Commitment Act will then be highlighted, giving special 
attention to the provisions of the Act that grant prosecutors with a unilateral 
right to a jury trial.
A. General Requirements for SVP Commitment Programs
The Supreme Court states that there are three criteria a SVP 
commitment statute must meet to be constitutional.22 First, an SVP act 
must be civil in nature, not criminal.23 If an SVP program is civil in nature, 
as opposed to criminal, traditional criminal law issues such as double 
jeopardy, cruel and unusual punishment, and ex post facto laws are not 
implicated.24 Second, an SVP program should require that the government 
prove three elements by the standard of either clear and convincing 
evidence or beyond a reasonable doubt: 1) the person has been convicted of 
a sexually violent offense; 2) the person suffers from a mental abnormality 
or personality disorder; and 3) the person is likely to further engage in acts 
of sexual violence.25 Third, an SVP program’s purpose must not be for 
18. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/1 (2016).
19. Thomas K. Zander, Civil Commitment Without Psychosis: The Law’s Reliance on the 
Weakest Links in Psychodiagnosis, 1 J. SEXUAL OFFENDER CIVIL COMMITMENT 17, 22 (2005).
20. David A. Singleton, Sex Offender Residency Statutes and the Culture of Fear: The Case for 
More Meaningful Rational Basis Review of Fear-Driven Public Safety Laws, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 600, 
602 (2006).
21. See Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CAL. L.
REV. 2093, 2097 (2010).
22. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 350 (1997); United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 
126, 131 (2010); Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 409 (2002).
23. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
24. Id. at 368. 
25. Id. at 352; see Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 431 (1978) (explaining that the standard of 
proof in civil commitment proceedings should be either beyond a reasonable doubt or clear and 
convincing evidence, not preponderance of the evidence). The state or federal government proves that 
the person has a mental illness through a series of mental health evaluations, and proves that the person 
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either retribution or deterrence, but must be for treatment of the committed 
person and the protection of society from dangerous individuals.26 Justice
Kennedy warned in Hendricks that if “treatment provisions were adopted 
as a sham or mere pretext” for confining sex offenders, the civil 
commitment scheme would be declared unconstitutional.27
B. Commitment Under Illinois SVP Commitment Act
The first step to civilly commit a prisoner in Illinois is written 
notification. The Illinois Department of Corrections (“IDOC”) must send 
written notification to the Illinois Attorney General or the county State’s 
Attorney, not later than six months prior to the individual’s anticipated 
release from imprisonment or mandatory supervised release, stating that an 
individual who was convicted of a sexually violent offense is set for 
release.28 The IDOC or any other agency with jurisdiction over the 
individual must provide the prosecutor’s office with information regarding 
the individual’s criminal history, mental condition, any treatment received 
by the individual, and the individual’s future residence.29 Once the State 
receives notice from IDOC, the prosecutor may choose to file an SVP 
petition alleging that all of the following apply to the person who is eligible 
for release (known as the “respondent”): 1) the respondent has been 
convicted of a sexually violent offense; 2) the respondent has a mental 
disorder; and 3) the respondent is dangerous to others because the person’s 
mental disorder creates a substantial probability that he or she will further 
engage in acts of sexual violence.30 A “mental disorder” is defined under 
the statute as “a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or 
volitional capacity that predisposes a person to engage in acts of sexual 
violence.”31 The statue does not give a definition of “substantial 
probability,” but it is understood that in order to prove substantial 
probability, the State must demonstrate that it is “much more likely than 
not” that the respondent will engage in acts of sexual violence if he is 
released from custody untreated.32
is likely to commit further acts of violence also through a number of psychiatric evaluations, risk 
factors, and recidivism analysis. See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 378–79.
26. Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 361. 
27. Id. at 371 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 




32. Ross A. Brennan, Note, Keeping the Dangerous Behind Bars: Redefining What a Sexually 
Violent Person Is in Illinois, 45 VAL. U. L. REV. 551, 566 (2011).
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Once the prosecutor files an SVP petition, a court must review the 
petition to determine whether there is cause to believe that the respondent 
is eligible for commitment under the Act.33 If the court determines that 
cause exists, the respondent is then transferred from the custody of IDOC 
to the Illinois Department of Human Services (“DHS”).34 The court will 
then hold a hearing to determine whether there is probable cause to believe 
that the respondent is an SVP.35 The hearing must be held within seventy-
two hours after the petition is filed, unless the respondent waives this 
timeline allow more time to prepare for the probable cause hearing.36 If the 
court finds there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is an SVP, 
the court will order that the person remain in DHS custody for further 
evaluation and will set a date for a commitment trial.37 If the court finds 
that there is not probable cause to believe the offender is an SVP, the 
respondent is returned to IDOC for release proceedings.38 The trial to 
determine whether the respondent is an SVP must take place no later than 
120 days after the finding of probable cause, unless the respondent waives 
this timeline in order to have more time to prepare for the commitment 
trial.39 At the trial, the respondent, the respondent’s attorney, the county 
State’s Attorney, or the Attorney General may request a jury trial, as 
opposed to trying the case in front of a judge.40 If neither side requests a 
jury, the case will be tried before a judge at a bench trial.41
At the SVP commitment trial, the prosecutor has the burden of 
proving the three elements for SVP commitment beyond a reasonable 
doubt.42 At the trial, the judge or jury will hear all of the relevant evidence 
of respondent’s sexually violent crimes, evidence about his or her mental 
state, and information about whether the respondent is substantially 
probable to engage in further acts of sexual violence. The judge or jury will 
hear the prosecutor’s evidence in the form of opinions from psychologists, 
psychiatrists, or both.43 The SVP respondent may present their own 
witnesses if they wish, but they have no obligation to present evidence.44 If
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the judge or jury determines that the State has proved that the respondent 
fulfills the elements of the SVP Commitment Act beyond a reasonable 
doubt, the court will then enter a judgment against the respondent and the 
respondent will be committed to DHS custody.45 If the judge or jury finds 
that the prosecutor has not proved that the respondent is a SVP beyond a 
reasonable doubt, the respondent will be returned to IDOC for release 
proceedings.46 Once the court enters a commitment order against the 
respondent, there are two options for where the respondent will receive 
their control, care, and treatment.47 The first option is that the respondent 
can be placed on conditional release in the community.48 The second option 
is the respondent will be committed in a DHS Treatment and Detention 
Facility (“TDF”), where the respondent will remain until such a time that 
they are no longer a SVP or are granted conditional release.49
C. Release from a TDF Under Illinois SVP Commitment Act
1. Discharge Through Periodic Evaluation
Once a respondent is found to be an SVP and is committed to DHS, 
there are three main processes by which the respondent can be released 
from civil commitment. The first is through periodic evaluation.50 A
committed person must be given periodic reevaluations at least once every 
twelve months.51 These periodic reevaluations must be submitted in a 
written report to the court which entered the commitment order.52 The 
purpose of the reevaluation is to determine whether the respondent 1) has 
made sufficient progress in treatment to be conditionally released or 2) the 
respondent’s condition has so changed from the most recent evaluation or 
commitment that the respondent is no longer a SVP.53 If the evaluator finds 
that the respondent has made sufficient progress in their treatment, or is no 











54. Id.; id. 207/65(b)(3).
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2. Petition for Conditional Release
A respondent can also be released from DHS custody by petitioning
the court for conditional release.55 A respondent or the prosecutor’s office 
may petition the committing court to modify its order for conditional 
release, so long as at least twelve months have elapsed since the initial 
commitment order or the most recent continuing commitment order.56 Once
the court receives the petition for conditional release, the court may appoint 
an examiner to evaluate the mental condition of the respondent and report 
to the court.57 The prosecutor’s office then has the right to have the 
respondent evaluated by the State’s experts.58 After the examinations are 
completed, the court will set a probable cause hearing.59 If the court finds 
that there is probable cause to believe that the respondent is no longer 
substantially probable to engage in acts of sexual violence while on 
conditional release, the court will set a hearing date for further 
consideration.60 At the next hearing, the court, without a jury, will hear the 
petition as soon as all reports are filed.61 The court must grant the petition 
unless the State proves by clear and convincing evidence that the 
respondent has not made sufficient progress in treatment and is still 
substantially probable to engage in acts of sexual violence.62 If the State 
cannot meet this burden, the court will notify DHS that the respondent 
should enter into conditional release. If the court finds that the State has 
met its burden, the person will remain in custody at the TDF.63
3. Petition for Discharge from DHS Custody
Much like a petition for conditional release, a petition for full 
discharge from DHS custody begins with a petition from the respondent, 
his or her attorney, or the prosecutor’s office.64 After the court receives the 
petition, the court will set a probable cause hearing to determine whether 
facts exist to believe that the respondent’s condition has so changed in the 
time since his or her most recent periodic reexamination that the respondent 









64. Id. 207/65(b)(1). 
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is no longer an SVP.65 If the court finds the petition frivolous or that the 
respondent was recently found to be an SVP, the court will deny the 
petition.66 If not, the court may find that there is probable cause that the 
petitioner is no longer an SVP, and set a hearing on the issue.67 At this 
hearing, unlike a hearing for conditional release, either the respondent or 
the prosecutor’s office may demand a jury.68 The finding of the jury must 
be unanimous.69 The State must prove by clear and convincing evidence 
that the person is still an SVP.70 If the State does not meet this standard, the 
respondent is released from DHS custody, but if the State proves the person 
is still an SVP, the person remains committed at a TDF.71 The respondent 
can also be placed on conditional release.
The text of the SVP Commitment Act seems to present the defendant 
with a choice as to whether they would prefer a bench trial or a jury trial, 
similar to criminal trials.72 However, this is an illusory choice for SVP 
respondents. Despite allowing for the respondent to demand a jury trial or a 
bench trial, the Act also allows for the prosecutor to request a jury during 
the commitment or discharge proceedings.73 Thus when the State 
determines that it wants a jury trial, the respondent’s decision is overridden, 
regardless of the respondent’s right to a bench trial. The respondent only 
has a right to a bench trial if the prosecutor chooses to allow it. This 
illusory right to choose whether a respondent will face a bench trial or jury 
trial does not exist in other Illinois in other civil commitment proceedings, 
and also differs from SVP commitment acts in other jurisdictions.
D. Jury Requests in Civil Commitment Proceedings
Section 207/20 of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act specifically states 
that all proceedings under the act are civil in nature, and thus not 
criminal.74 This is a very important distinction. The fact that the statute is 
civil means that the SVP Commitment Act is not subject to the Sixth 
Amendment requirement that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused 








72. See id. 207/35(c).
73. Id.
74. Id. 207/20.
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State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed.”75 The
Supreme Court has deemed the Sixth Amendment protections 
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice,” and has held that Sixth 
Amendment protections apply in all federal and state criminal trials.76
However, because commitment statutes such as the Illinois SVP 
Commitment Act are civil in nature, the Sixth Amendment protections do 
not apply.77
Because a civil commitment is not a criminal action, it is not governed 
by the Sixth Amendment, but rather the Seventh Amendment.78 In civil 
trials, the Seventh Amendment governs whether the parties have the right 
to a jury.79 The Seventh Amendment provides “[i]n Suits at common law, 
where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial 
by jury shall be preserved.”80 Therefore, a jury trial is only guaranteed in 
civil cases if the particular action was accompanied by a right to a jury trial 
under the English common law.81 The Seventh Amendment is unique in 
that it is one of the few constitutional amendments that has not been 
incorporated to apply to the states.82 This means that the Supreme Court 
has not ruled that the Seventh Amendment applies to citizens in each of the 
fifty states, and that states are “free to make an independent determination 
of the scope of the right under merged courts.”83
The Illinois Constitution states that “[t]he right of trial by jury as 
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”84 The Illinois Supreme Court 
has interpreted this to mean that the right to a jury trial is preserved in the 
same state as it was under the English common law.85 When evaluating 
whether a civil plaintiff, such as an SVP respondent, is entitled to a civil 
jury trial, Illinois courts will look to the English common law to determine 
if that cause of action was granted a right to a jury trial.86 In Smith v. 
People ex rel. Bartholomew, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded that the 
75. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
76. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
77. Richard L. Peterson, Note, Unintelligent Jury Waivers: A Call to Amend Federal Rule of 
Criminal Procedure 23(a), 21 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L.J. 441, 446 (2011).
78. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
79. Paul Mogin, Why Judges, Not Juries, Should Set Punitive Damages, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 179, 
184–85 (1998). 
80. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
81. Mogin, supra note 79, at 186.
82. Eric J. Hamilton, Federalism and the State Civil Jury Rights, 65 STAN. L. REV. 851, 852
(2010).
83. Id. at 854.
84. ILL. CONST. art. I, § 13.
85. Lazarus v. Vill. of Northbrook, 199 N.E.2d 797, 799 (Ill. 1964). 
86. See id.
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Illinois Constitution guaranteed a right to a jury trial in non-SVP civil 
commitment proceedings.87 The Illinois Supreme Court ruled in Smith that 
the insanity commitment of the petitioner was constitutionally valid 
because the individual was afforded written notification, a hearing, and 
proper service before being declared insane by a jury.88 The Illinois 
Supreme Court stated that if the individual was committed by the State 
without a determination by a jury, the commitment would have been in 
“derogation of the rights of civil liberty guaranteed by the constitution.”89
Thus Illinois civil commitment respondents have a right to a jury trial. 
Smith did not however grant the prosecutors the right to demand a jury trial 
in civil commitment trials, nor to override a respondent’s request for a 
bench trial.
II. DUE PROCESS PROTECTIONS IN SVP COMMITMENT PROGRAMS
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution declares, “[n]o person 
shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of 
law.”90 The Fourteenth Amendment similarly reads, “[n]o state shall make 
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”91 These two amendments, 
taken together, comprise what is known as the Due Process Clause, which 
ensures that “neither the federal nor the state governments can deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.”92
There are two distinct protections that American citizens are afforded 
under the Due Process Clause. The first protection is often called 
“procedural due process.”93 This refers to the actual procedures that federal 
and state governments must follow in order to take a person’s life, liberty, 
or property.94 For example, procedural due process challenges typically 
involve improper notice, unfair timelines, or the government agents not 
following the proper procedural safeguards.95 The second protection 
87. Smith v. People ex rel. Bartholomew, 65 Ill. 375, 379 (1872).
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
91. Id. amend. XIV, § 1.
92. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 603 (4th ed. 2013).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (holding that 
petitioner could not terminate respondent’s employment without allowing proper time for review and 
providing adequate notice). 
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afforded by the Due Process Clause is called “substantive due process.”96
Substantive due process ensures that federal and state governments have a 
compelling reason for taking a person’s liberty, and that the action is
“reasonable in relation to its subject and is adopted in the interests of the 
community.”97 Substantive due process protects those rights that are 
“implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.”98 The Due Process Clause 
promotes procedural fairness and ensures that any deprivation of liberty is 
supported by a reasonable and compelling government purpose.99
When evaluating a statute that deprives a fundamental liberty interest, 
the Supreme Court demands that the government have a compelling state 
interest in depriving that person of their liberty, and that the liberty is only 
taken by means that are narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s 
purpose.100 Because SVP laws involve a large amount of procedure and 
process, SVP laws must be written, and enforced, in a way that guarantees 
all individuals will have their procedural due process rights respected. SVP 
civil commitment laws must also conform to the “rights implicit in the 
concept of ordered liberty.”101 In order for an SVP Act to be constitutional, 
the government must have a compelling reason to take away the liberty of 
the committed individual. The following sections will focus on how federal 
courts have recently found SVP civil commitment acts in other states to be 
unconstitutional, and how the Illinois SVP Commitment Act violates the 
substantive due process rights of committed SVPs in Illinois.
A. Due Process Challenges to Minnesota SVP Commitment Act
In 2015, fourteen individuals civilly committed under the Minnesota 
Sex Offender Program (“MSOP”) sued its administrators and employees in 
the District Court of Minnesota on behalf of a class of over 700 
committees, seeking a declaratory judgment that the MSOP was 
unconstitutional both as written and as applied.102 The district court first 
considered the constitutionality of the MSOP as written. The district court 
reiterated the constitutional basis for civil commitment programs from 
Hendricks, stating, “a civil commitment statutory scheme is permitted 
96. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92.
97. W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
98. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 322 (1937), overruled by Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784 (1969).
99. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 92, at 603.
100. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997). 
101. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
102. Karsjens v. Jesson, 109 F. Supp. 3d 1139, 1146 (D. Minn. 2015), rev’d sub nom. Karsjens v. 
Piper, 845 F.3d 394 (8th Cir. 2017).
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provided that an individual is not detained past the time they are no longer 
dangerous.”103 The district court stated that whenever legislation affects an 
individual’s fundamental rights, the standard of “strict scrutiny” will be 
applied to determine if the law is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling 
government interest.104 The district court interpreted Hendricks to require 
that SVP commitment statutes be narrowly tailored to “ensure that 
individuals are committed no longer than necessary to serve the state’s 
compelling interests.”105 The Minnesota District Court cited three reasons 
for requiring states to have such a strict standard when crafting SVP 
commitment acts. First, individuals have a fundamental right to live free 
and not have their rights curtailed.106 Second, civil commitment is a 
deprivation of liberty that requires due process protections.107 Third, the 
loss of liberty through involuntary civil commitment is a greater loss of 
freedom than criminal confinement, as it does not involve the twin goals of 
the criminal justice system, punishment and deterrence.108
The district court concluded that Minnesota failed to demonstrate that 
the MSOP was narrowly tailored to meet the purpose of protecting the 
public from SVPs while still protecting the liberties of the committed 
SVPs, and declared the MSOP unconstitutional as written.109 The court 
stated that “[b]ecause the statute renders discharge from the MSOP more 
onerous than admission to it [the MSOP] is not narrowly tailored and 
results in a punitive effect” on respondents.110 Because the statute was not 
narrowly tailored to serve the compelling government interest of protecting 
the public from dangerous individuals, the district court declared the MSOP 
an unconstitutional violation of the Due Process Clause. When evaluating 
the constitutionality of the MSOP as applied, the district court again 
applied the standard of strict scrutiny and declared the MSOP 
unconstitutional.111 The court stated that the MSOP is applied in a manner 
that “results in plaintiffs being confined to the MSOP beyond such a time 
as they either meet the statutory reduction in custody criteria or no longer 
satisfy the constitutional threshold for continued commitment.”112 The 
103. Id. at 1167. 
104. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721.
105. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1168.
106. Id. at 1167.
107. Id.; see also Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 368–69 (1996).
108. Karsjens, 109 F. Supp. 3d. at 1167. 
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district court found that too many individuals remain confined at the MSOP 
even though they have “completed treatment, can no longer benefit from 
treatment, or have reduced their risk below the ‘highly likely to reoffend 
standard.’”113
However, in January 2017, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
heard an appeal of Karsjens v. Jesson and reversed the decision of the 
Minnesota District Court.114 The Eighth Circuit disagreed with the district 
court’s decision to apply the standard of strict scrutiny to the SVPs’ 
claims.115 The Eighth Circuit stated that rather than proving that the statute 
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest, Minnesota 
only needed to prove that the statute has a rational relationship to the 
government’s purpose.116 This is a significant difference, and one that has a 
very adverse effect on the committed offenders’ claims. Under the strict 
scrutiny standard, the government has the burden of demonstrating that the 
statute is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling governmental 
interest.117 The government carries the burden of proving to the court that 
the statute is constitutional. Under rational relation review, the burden is 
not with the State, but is rather with the petitioners, who must prove to the 
court that the statute is not reasonably related to the government’s 
interest.118 Courts are much more deferential to the state legislation under 
rational relation review than strict scrutiny review.119 In order for the 
person challenging a statute to prevail under rational relation review, the 
person must demonstrate that “the [state defendants’] conduct was 
conscience-shocking, and that the [state defendants] violated one or more 
fundamental rights that are ‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition.’”120
When applying rational relation review to the SVP’s claims, the 
Eighth Circuit determined the claimants could not demonstrate that the 
MSOP program and the Minnesota SVP act were not rationally related to 
the purpose of protecting the public.121 The court held that the “extensive 
process and the protections to persons committed under [the act] are 
113. Id. at 1171.
114. Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 398 (8th Cir. 2017).
115. Id. at 406–07.
116. Id. at 407–08.
117. Id. at 409.
118. Id.
119. Williams v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
120. Karsjens, 845 F.3d at 408 (alteration in original) (quoting Moran v. Clarke, 296 F.3d 638, 651 
(8th Cir. 2002)).
121. Id. at 410.
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rationally related to the State’s legitimate interest of protecting its citizens 
from sexually dangerous persons.”122 Because the statute was rationally 
related to the SVP act’s stated purpose, the Eighth Circuit reversed the 
district court’s decision, and held the program was constitutional as 
written.123 The Eighth Circuit also applied rational relation review to the 
committed individuals’ constitutional challenge to the act as applied, and 
reversed the district court’s decision.124 The Eighth Circuit held that under 
rational relation review, none of the individuals’ claims were so 
“conscience-shocking” as to be declared unconstitutional.125
The Eighth Circuit’s decision creates an exception for SVPs when 
evaluating constitutional challenges to statutes that restrict an individual’s 
freedom. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a state’s 
infringement upon an individual’s fundamental liberty must be narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.126 State statutes that 
remove a person’s fundamental liberties were given the highest possible 
level of scrutiny. However, in Karsjens v. Piper, the Eighth Circuit held 
that the Supreme Court has “never declared that persons who pose a 
significant danger to themselves or others possess a fundamental liberty 
interest in freedom from physical restraint.”127 The court argues that the 
liberty interests of sex offenders are not “absolute” because they pose a 
danger to themselves and to society.128 However, sex offenders are citizens 
of this country, and the Supreme Court has previously held that all citizens 
should have their fundamental interests protected by strict scrutiny 
review.129 The Eighth Circuit’s ruling thus either classifies sex offenders as 
a sub-class of citizens who do not receive strict scrutiny review, or it is in 
conflict with Supreme Court precedent. The standard of review for sex 
offender legislation is an open issue in all other circuits, and may ultimately 
need Supreme Court review to settle the matter.
B. Due Process Challenges to Missouri SVP Commitment Act
A separate 2015 federal district court case, Van Orden v. Schafer,
considered the Due Process Clause challenges of SVPs committed under 
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 407–08.
125. Id. at 410–11.
126. See Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–
21 (1997).
127. 845 F. Supp. 3d at 407.
128. Id.
129. See Flores, 507 U.S. at 302; Washington, 521 U.S. at 720–21.
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the Missouri SVP act and the Missouri Sex Offender Rehabilitation and 
Treatment Services Program (“SORTS”).130 When evaluating whether the 
Missouri SVP act was facially unconstitutional, the district court rejected 
the use of strict scrutiny, as advocated by the plaintiffs, but did state that a 
narrow construction was required when evaluating the plaintiffs’ due 
process claims.131 The SVP act needed to “bear some reasonable relation to 
the purpose for which the individual is committed.”132 Using this standard, 
the court found that the Missouri SVP act was facially constitutional, 
because as written, the SVP act requires release of a civilly committed 
person if the person is found to be “no longer dangerous, regardless of 
whether the reason he is no longer dangerous is primarily mental or 
physical.”133 The court also found that the SVP act provides for the full 
release of civilly committed persons by fair procedures, and is therefore 
facially constitutional.134
However, the district court cautioned that SVP commitment acts lend 
themselves to much more constitutional scrutiny as applied, as opposed to 
as written.135 This is because legislatures can craft legislation that falls 
within the guidelines of Hendricks, but the actual application of that 
legislation goes beyond the constitutional limits of the statute.136 With this 
restriction in mind, the District Court ruled that the Missouri SVP act was 
unconstitutional as applied.137 First, the court ruled that manner in which 
the Missouri SORTS program conducted its reviews violated the 
procedural due process rights of committed individuals.138 The court found 
that evaluation procedures were so varied and applied so inconsistently that 
many individuals who no longer met the dangerousness requirement were 
still being held at SORTS treatment centers.139 Second, the court found that 
the application of the SORTS program was unconstitutional as to its last 
phase, community reintegration.140 The court found that progress through 
the various treatment programs was “torturously slow,” and that lack of 
clear timelines resulted in committed individuals being held in the SORTS 
130. Van Orden v. Shafer, 129 F. Supp. 3d. 839, 841–42 (E.D. Mo. 2015), vacated in part on 
reconsideration sub nom. Van Orden v. Stringer, 262 F. Supp. 3d 887 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
131. Id. at 864.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 865.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 867.
136. Id.
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program for longer than should be constitutionally allowed.141 The court 
concluded by noting that “these systemic failures have created a pervasive 
sense of hopelessness at SORTS that is undermining what little 
improvement the SORTS treatment programs have made.”142
However, after the Eighth Circuit issued its opinion in Karsjens v. 
Piper, and reversed the Minnesota District Court’s decision finding the 
Minnesota SVP act unconstitutional, the Eastern District of Missouri 
reconsidered its decision in Van Orden v. Schafer.143 In its reconsidered 
opinion, the district court recognized that the Eighth Circuit used the 
“highly deferential reasonable relationship review” standard when 
reviewing the SVPs’ due process challenge.144 The district court also 
acknowledged that the SVPs’ as-applied challenge needed to demonstrate 
“both that the state defendants’ conduct was conscience-shocking, and that
the state defendants violated one or more fundamental rights.”145 In light of 
these standards from the Eighth Circuit, the district court reversed its 
earlier decision in Van Orden v. Schafer.146 Because the Eighth Circuit held 
that SVP commitment does not implicate a fundamental liberty interest, 
and that rational relation review should apply, the district court upheld the 
Missouri SVP act as constitutional as written. This also defeated the SVPs 
as-applied challenge, because without a fundamental liberty interest, no 
amount of conscience-shocking behavior from the State could defeat the 
legislation on due process grounds.147
Although the district court reversed its earlier decision based on the 
Eighth Circuit’s Karsjens v. Piper decision, the district court did point out 
some flaws in Piper. The district court stated “these holdings [by the 
Eighth Circuit] raise troubling questions as to whether civil commitment 
statutes can ever be challenged on as-applied substantive due process 
grounds,” but acknowledged that the Eighth Circuit’s opinion was binding 
on the district court.148 Furthermore, the district court stated that while it 
did find some of the State’s behavior conscience-shocking—such as
continuing to confine infirm, aged individuals who are undisputedly no 
longer dangerous—the Piper decision negated these concerns, because 
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Van Orden v. Stringer, 262 F. Supp. 3d 887, 888–91 (E.D. Mo. 2017).
144. Id. at 892.
145. Id. (quoting Karsjens v. Piper, 845 F.3d 394, 408 (8th Cir. 2017)). 
146. Id. at 894.
147. Id. at 893–94.
148. Id.
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there is no fundamental liberty interest involved.149 This again raises the 
question of how a person being confined indefinitely by an SVP act does 
not have a fundamental interest in his liberty. The district court, while 
following the Eighth Circuit’s precedent, critiques it in a manner that 
suggests it questions the constitutionality of the Eighth Circuit’s holding in 
Piper.
C. Due Process Violations of Illinois SVP Commitment Act
Although the recent rulings in Piper and Van Orden v. Stringer seem 
to complicate the prospects of an as-written or as-applied Due Process 
Clause challenge to the Illinois SVP Act, it is important to note that the 
Seventh Circuit has not ruled on whether SVPs have a fundamental liberty 
interest, and, contrary to what the Eighth Circuit seems to believe in Piper,
neither has the Supreme Court. Therefore, the recent evaluations of SVP 
programs in Minnesota and Missouri provide a unique opportunity to 
review the constitutionality of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act. In 
particular, the SVP Commitment Act’s provisions that grant prosecutors 
the unilateral right to a jury trial significantly impact SVPs due process 
rights. During a jury trial, SVP respondents face an unfair level of 
prejudice in their trials because jurors have an unreasonably heightened 
fear of sex offenders. This results in SVP respondents being either 
committed to state custody or being kept in the state custody for longer 
than if they could be heard by a judge at a bench trial. The following 
sections will demonstrate how the State right to a jury trial is out of step 
with civil commitment proceedings in other jurisdictions and Illinois state 
laws, how jury trials subject SVP respondents to an unfair amount of 
prejudice, and how the State right to a jury trial results in SVP respondents 
being unconstitutionally detained after they are no longer substantially 
likely to commit acts of sexual violence.
1. Prosecutor’s Lack of Jury Trial Right in Other States and Illinois 
Statutes
There are three distinct sections of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act 
that provide either the SVP respondent or the prosecutor with the right to 
demand a jury trial.150 In Illinois, a respondent’s constitutional right to a 
jury trial in a civil commitment proceeding was established in Smith v. 
149. Id. at 894.
150. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/25(d) (2016); id. 207/35(c); id. 207/65(b)(2).
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People ex rel. Bartholomew.151 However, other states have not declared 
that the common law guarantees a right to a jury trial in civil commitment 
proceedings. Notably, the Minnesota Supreme Court has determined that 
the right to a jury trial does not apply to civil commitment proceedings, 
which are heard only by probate judges.152 Similarly, when a civilly 
committed individual in Minnesota petitions to be released from custody, 
their petitions are heard by a judge, not a jury.153 While the majority of 
states with civil commitment statutes grant the respondent a right to a jury 
trial under the common law, this is not the case across all jurisdictions.154
There are many other states that do not grant the prosecutor’s office a 
right to a jury trial in SVP civil commitment proceedings. In Minnesota, 
SVP civil commitment proceedings are tried by judges alone.155 Minnesota 
established a panel of district judges with statewide authority to preside 
over commitment proceedings, without a jury right for either the 
respondent or the State.156 North Dakota’s SVP program states that SVP 
commitment proceedings “must be tried to the court and not a jury.”157
New York’s SVP program provides that the respondent has the right to 
waive a jury trial in SVP proceedings, and does not give the State the right 
to force the case to be heard by a jury.158 While some other states do 
provide a State right to a jury trial, the provisions in the Illinois SVP 
Commitment Act that allow the prosecutor to unilaterally request a jury are 
not universal among the twenty states that have SVP programs.
The Illinois SVP Commitment Act is not the only civil commitment 
act in Illinois. It is, however, the only civil commitment act that grants the 
prosecutor a unilateral right to a jury trial. The Illinois Sexually Dangerous 
Persons (“SDP”) Act was also enacted to control and monitor sex 
offenders.159 The SDP Act, as opposed to the SVP Commitment Act, 
151. Smith v. People ex rel. Bartholomew, 65 Ill. 375, 379 (1872). 
152. People ex rel. Pearson v. Prob. Court of Ramsey Cty., 287 N.W. 297, 303 (Minn. 1939).
153. C. Peter Erlinder, Essay: Of Rights Lost and Rights Found: The Coming Restoration of the 
Right to a Jury Trial in Minnesota Civil Commitment Proceedings, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1269,
1269 (2003).
154. Id. at 1274.
155. MINN. STAT. § 253D.07 (2016).
156. Id. § 253D.11.
157. N.D. CENT. CODE § 25-03.3-13 (2016).
158. N.Y. MENTAL HYG. § 10.07(b) (McKinney 2017). However, parts of this statute were held 
unconstitutional by the District Court for the Southern District of New York, holding that the detention 
procedures used under this statute unconstitutionally held respondents when they had yet to be 
determined dangerous. See Mental Hygiene Legal Serv. v. Cuomo, 785 F. Supp. 2d 205, 229 (S.D.N.Y. 
2011), vacated sub nom. Mental Hygiene Legal Servs. v. Schneiderman, 472 F. App’x 45 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
159. Illinois Sexually Dangerous Persons Act, 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 205/1.01–12 (2016).
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applies to individuals who are being charged in a pending criminal 
proceeding.160 Under the SDP Act, when a person is charged with a crime, 
and the Attorney General or county prosecutor believes that the person is 
an SDP, the prosecutor can file a petition to have the person declared an 
SDP and committed to the Director of Corrections, who will keep the 
person in custody until they are no longer a SDP.161 Procedurally, the SDP 
Act functions in many of the same ways as the Illinois SVP Commitment 
Act. The proceedings are civil in nature, the burden of proof for 
commitment is beyond a reasonable doubt, and the State must prove that 
the individual has a mental disorder and is likely to continue to commit 
sexual offenses.162 However, unlike the SVP Commitment Act, the SDP 
Act does not give the prosecutor the right to a jury trial, and only the SDP 
respondent can demand a jury trial.163 Similarly, under the Illinois Mental 
Health and Developmental Disabilities Code, only the respondent, not the 
prosecutor, has a right to a jury trial in the civil commitment of 
dangerously mentally ill individuals.164
Illinois prosecutors do not have a right to a jury in criminal cases 
either.165 In People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, the Illinois Supreme Court 
considered the case of numerous defendants who had wished to waive their 
right to a jury trial, but had their waivers blocked by the prosecutor, who 
wished to have a jury trial.166 The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed a 
lengthy history of the right to a jury trial in Illinois, reviewing the meaning 
of the Illinois Constitution’s decree that “[t]he right to a jury trial as 
heretofore enjoyed shall remain inviolate.”167 After conducting this 
analysis, the court held that “[s]hort of a constitutional amendment to that 
effect, the legislature cannot now deprive an accused in Illinois of any part 
of that constitutionally protected right.”168 Under all Illinois criminal 
proceedings, the defendant alone can decide whether to waive the right to a 
jury trial, and if the defendant chooses to waive this right, the prosecution 
cannot force the defendant in front of a jury. The SVP Commitment Act is 
the only legislation in the entire state that grants the prosecutor’s office a 
unilateral right to a jury trial.
160. Id. 205/3.
161. Id. 205/8.
162. See id. 205/3.01; id. 205/4.03. 
163. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT 205/5.
164. 405 ILL COMP. STAT. 5/3-802 (2016).
165. People ex rel. Daley v. Joyce, 533 N.E.2d 873, 884 (Ill. 1998) (Miller, J., dissenting).
166. Id. at 211.
167. Id. at 213–14.
168. Id. at 222.
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The federal SVP commitment program also does not provide 
prosecutors the right to a jury trial. In 2006, Congress passed the Adam 
Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act, legislation designed to “protect 
children from sexual exploitation and violent crime, to prevent child abuse 
and child pornography . . . [and] promote Internet safety.”169 As part of the 
larger Adam Walsh Act, Congress created a federal sex offender civil 
commitment program.170 The program was upheld as constitutional in 
United States v. Comstock, using the same analysis the Supreme Court 
applied in Kansas v. Hendricks.171 The federal SVP scheme operates in 
many of the same ways as the Illinois SVP Commitment Act, including the 
same commitment criteria and many of the same procedures.172 However,
there are no jury trials in the federal scheme. After a person is named as a 
SVP respondent, the court will hold a hearing to determine if the person is 
a SVP.173 At the hearing, the respondent is given opportunity to testify, to 
present evidence, subpoena witnesses, and to confront and cross-examine 
witnesses who appear at the hearing.174 The federal SVP commitment 
statute only allows trials to be heard in front of a judge, and respondents are 
not subjected to the biases that jurors have against sex offenders.175
2. Juror Fears of Sex Offenders
Public fear of sex offenders was one of the biggest forces that led to 
the adoption of sex offender commitment programs at the state and federal 
levels in the 1990s and early 2000s.176 Sex offender laws passed in the 
1990s and early 2000s differed from the sexual psychopath laws passed in 
the 1930s in two main ways. First, the new SVP laws were primarily aimed 
at sex offenders who were already convicted and sentenced for sexually 
violent crimes.177 Second, these laws were targeted at those offenders who 
were about to be released from imprisonment or insanity commitment.178 In
some states, there was a direct correlation between a specific sexually 
violent crime that captured the public’s attention and subsequent sex 
offender civil commitment legislation. For example, in Washington state, 
169. Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 4248 (2016).
171. United States v. Comstock, 560 U.S. 126, 131 (2010). 
172. 18 U.S.C. § 4248(a).
173. Id.
174. 18 U.S.C. § 4247(d).
175. Id.; see also Comstock, 560 U.S. at 130–31.
176. Singleton, supra note 20, at 609.
177. Zander, supra note 19, at 22.
178. Id.
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the passage of its SVP civil commitment law was in response to public 
outrage over the rape and mutilation of a seven-year old boy by a mentally 
ill man named Earl Shriner, who professed an interest in committing 
sexually violent crimes once he was released from prison.179 Similarly, in 
New Jersey, a civil commitment statute was passed in response to public 
outrage at the release of a sexually violent offender who had served his 
sentence, but expressed an intent to continue committing sexually violent 
crimes once released.180
Due to the often sensationalistic and disturbing coverage of sex 
offenders in the news media, public panic and fear of sex offenders 
pervades communities, the same communities where potential jurors are 
chosen from.181 It is not just the Geraldo Riveras of the world who promote 
and sensationalize coverage of sex offenders. A New York Times op-ed in 
1993 stated that, “[t]here can be no dispute that monsters live among us. 
The only question is what to do with them once they become known to 
us.”182 Media coverage of sexually violent crimes, particularly 
sensationalistic coverage, creates “an environment in which the ‘common 
wisdom’ about sex offenders is distorted” and in turns to lead to more fear, 
and thus more misunderstanding.183 These media depictions are out of 
touch with reality; although the national crime rate fell 20% between 1990 
and 1998, and sexually violent crime fell 14%, television coverage of 
violent crime increased 83% during this same time period.184
Sensationalistic coverage of sex offenders can “instill fear in the American 
public regarding sexual abuse . . . [leaving] people with a sense of 
hopelessness and helplessness in addressing the problem.”185 There is a 
cyclical pattern to the instilment of fear in the public over the threats posed 
179. See generally ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, WASHINGTON’S




180. Claudine M. Leone, New Jersey Assembly Bill 155—A Bill Allowing the Civil Commitment of 
Violent Sex Offenders After the Completion of a Criminal Sentence, 18 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 890, 890–
96 (1994).
181. Id. at 901. 
182. Andrew Vachss, Sex Predators Can’t Be Saved, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 1993, at A15.
183. Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, “They’re Planting Stories in the Press”: The 
Impact of Media Distortion on Sex Offender Law and Policy, 3 U. DENV. CRIM. L. REV. 185, 208 (2013)
[hereinafter Cucolo & Perlin, Media Distortion]; see also Heather Ellis Cucolo & Michael L. Perlin, 
Preventing Sex-Offender Recidivism Through Therapeutic Jurisprudence Approaches and Specialized 
Community Integration, 22 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 1, 2 (2012).
184. Singleton, supra note 20.
185. Robert E. Freeman-Longo, Reducing Sexual Abuse in America: Legislating Tougher Laws or 
Public Education and Prevention, 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 303, 308 (1997).
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by sex offenders. Media coverage of sex offenders results in greater public 
fear of sex offenders, which results in more media coverage, which results 
in more fear.186
As a result of fear-driven media coverage, there was immense pressure 
on legislators to pass new legislation aimed at curtailing the freedoms of 
sex offenders, and pressure on judges to issue longer and more strict 
sentences.187 Sex offenders, and the potential risk they pose to 
communities, are often prominently featured in political races. Many 
legislators and even some judges are happy to inflame public fear of sex 
offenders for political gain.188 In Illinois, the 2014 gubernatorial race 
between Pat Quinn and Bruce Rauner featured a particularly notorious ad 
titled “Unthinkable,” which the Rauner campaign released to attack Quinn 
for an allegedly secret program to release sex offenders.189 The truth of this 
attack was factually questionable, but Rauner ultimately won the 
election.190 The reality is that the public is not at a particularly high risk of 
harm from convicted sex offenders. Very few sex offenders ultimately are 
ever arrested for committing a new sex crime.191 Sex offenders are much 
less likely than non-sex offenders to be rearrested for any crime at all.192
Despite these facts, public fear and misconception has led many jurors to 
believe that sex offender recidivism rates are close to 100%, when that is 
far from the truth.193 The unfortunate result of this pattern is that when sex 
offenders are put in front of a jury for a commitment trial or discharge 
hearing, the ingrained public fear of sex offenders leads to a jury that is 
afraid of sex offenders and desires to keep offenders confined for as long as 
possible.194
Each time a network news special features sex offenders, a columnist 
pens an op-ed about the evils of sexual crimes, or a politician attacks their 
opponent for allegedly releasing a sex offender, the public at large is 
further reinforced in their opinion that sex offenders are dangerous and 
186. Cucolo & Perlin, Media Distortion, supra note 183, at 187.
187. Singleton, supra note 20, at 609.
188. Cucolo & Perlin, Media Distortion, supra note 183, at 211.
189. John O’Connor, FACT CHECK: Rauner’s Ad Generalizes Some Facts About Illinois 
Governor’s Early-Release Program, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT (Sept. 24, 2014, 6:52 PM), 
https://www.usnews.com/news/politics/articles/2014/09/24/fact-check-rauner-early-prison-release-tv-
ad?src=usn_tw [http://perma.cc/G3MY-M23Y].
190. See Brian Cassella, Rauner Unseats Gov. Quinn, CHI. TRIB. (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.chicagotribune.com/chi-end-chicago-rauner-wins-wre0023707210-20141103-photo.html 
[http://perma.cc/JT7Q-Y2FB]. 
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despicable members of society who deserve the harshest condemnation.195
Ultimately, an individual’s knowledge of just one sexually violent crime 
can cause them to generalize their fear and biases against sex offenders as a 
whole class of individuals. These perceptions do not limit themselves just 
to the community, however. Fear, bias, and misconceptions also follow 
citizens into the jury room when they perform their civic duty and serve on 
an SVP commitment or discharge trial.196 When jurors act out of fear, it 
creates a greater risk that an SVP respondent will be confined beyond the 
point where they are actually dangerous, which results in a due process 
violation.
3. Effect of Juror Fears on Illinois SVP Respondents
The Illinois SVP Commitment Act allows for either the respondent, 
the respondent’s lawyer, the State’s Attorney, or the Attorney General to 
demand a jury trial in commitment proceedings.197 If neither side demands 
a jury trial, then the case will be heard by a judge.198 There are several 
factors a respondent must consider when choosing between a bench trial or 
a jury trial. The first factor that the respondent will need to consider is the 
ambiguity inherent in jury trials.199 A jury trial is determined by twelve 
separate individuals, many of whom have never served on a jury before.200
The respondent will have a difficult time determining the jury’s tendencies, 
and will not be able to tailor a juror-specific defense to the prosecution’s 
arguments.201 The second factor a respondent will need to consider is the 
relative lack of ambiguity that accompanies a bench trial.202 The
respondent’s lawyer can determine a judge’s tendencies by examining the 
judge’s prior decisions, and the attorney may have also tried similar cases 
in front of the judge and be familiar with his or her way of thinking. The
attorney also knows that the judge, unlike the jury, is well versed with the 
law and will require less explanation.203 A judge may also be less biased 
toward sex offenders than the public at large from handling many sex 
offender cases. The third factor is the “ick” factor that often accompanies 
195. Id. at 185.
196. Uzi Segal & Alex Stein, Ambiguity Aversion and the Criminal Process, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1495, 1536 (2006).
197. 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/65(b)(2) (2016).
198. Id.
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SVP commitment and discharge trials. Because all SVPs have been 
convicted of a sexually violent crime, their trial will inevitably involve 
some discussion of past crimes, some of which may be disturbing. The 
average jury member may be unable to look past this when making their 
decision, whereas a judge seasoned in SVP trials may not be as heavily 
affected by the “ick” factor.
SVP respondents may also consider the trend in criminal law that 
bench trials are more likely to result in acquittals than jury trials.204
Numerous studies have discovered that federal criminal trials that are tried 
in front of a judge as opposed to a jury are overwhelmingly more likely to 
result in acquittal.205 The average conviction rate in federal jury trials since 
1946 is 75%.206 Between 1995 and 2005, the federal jury conviction rate 
jumped up to 85%.207 In that same ten-year timeframe, conviction rates in 
federal bench trials was only 54%, almost 30% lower than the federal jury 
trial conviction rate.208 There are multiple explanations for this. First, for 
certain complex crimes, such as financial or corporate crimes, the inherent 
complexity in the evidence and defenses may lead to attorneys preferring a 
bench trial because the judge is more likely to understand the complex 
evidence than the jury.209 Second, defendants who employ “legalistic” 
defenses, which may be legally viable but inconsistent with a jury’s 
ingrained sense of justice, also benefit from bench trials.210 Third, 
defendants whose cases involve “horrible facts or unpopular defendants 
that might repel a jury” often elect for a bench trial.211 Unsurprisingly, sex 
offenders fall into this category.212 Jurors in cases where the facts are very 
horrific or outrageous can rush to judgment because of the inflammatory 
evidence, whereas a judge that is more familiar with these facts may not 
have his or her passions inflamed easily.213
After considering these factors, it is not surprising that SVP 
respondents may prefer their commitment or discharge trials to be heard by 
a judge rather than a jury. SVP cases are inherently complex. They often 
involve a large amount of testimony from psychologists and psychiatrists, 
204. Andrew D. Leipold, Why Are Federal Judges So Acquittal Prone?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 151, 
164–67 (2005).
205. Segal & Stein, supra note 196, at 1504; Leipold, supra note 204, at 164–65.
206. Leipold, supra note 204, at 164.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 169–70.
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who will offer opinions filled with field-specific terms and processes. This 
testimony can be very technical and repetitive, and can easily confuse an 
ordinary jury member who is unfamiliar with these terms. SVP trials are 
also subject to “legalistic” defenses that may be counter to a jury’s 
ingrained sense of justice. It may be hard for a jury to understand that 
although a SVP may have committed horrific crimes, the question is only 
whether they are substantially probable to continue to commit crimes, not 
whether the person is socially desirable. Finally, and most significantly, 
many SVP trials contain horrible facts, unpopular defendants, and 
information that is likely to inflame the passions of the jury. It has already 
been established that there is bias in almost every community against sex 
offenders. Many juries may simply be unable to get past the nature of the 
crimes that a SVP respondent committed.
The decision of whether a judge or jury should hear the case is not the 
respondent’s alone. The respondent can have a great rationale for preferring 
a bench trial as opposed to a jury trial, based on the considerations listed in 
the last two paragraphs. However, if the prosecutor unilaterally decides that 
he or she wishes to have a jury trial, a jury trial will be had. The prosecutor 
knows that the inherent biases of the jury members makes it much more 
likely that the respondent will be committed. The prosecutor knows that the 
continued commitment of sex offenders is something that can be politically 
useful for the State. A forced jury trial of an SVP respondent exposes the 
respondent to a higher risk of commitment than a bench trial would. The 
respondent faces a jury that must wade through complex issues, set aside 
ingrained biases against sex offenders, and look past sometimes horrific 
crimes that inflame the jurors’ passions. An SVP respondent can have their 
liberty restricted by being placed in a TDF even though they do not meet 
the statutory criteria. An SVP respondent can also have their liberty 
restricted by remaining in the TDF well past the point that they are no 
longer a SVP. Thus, the unilateral right to a jury trial in the Illinois SVP 
Commitment Act leads to Due Process Clause violations against Illinois 
SVP respondents.214 Any person who is deprived of their liberty without a 
compelling governmental reason, or has their liberty restricted beyond a
reasonable period, has had their Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment due 
process rights violated.
The substantial effect that jury trials have on the commitment and 
discharge of SVP respondents becomes very clear when examining the 
census reports maintained by the Illinois Department of Human Services. 
214. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 207/35 (2016). 
2018] MANDATORY JURY TRIALS 619
DHS keeps a monthly census of the respondents confined in TDFs, 
beginning with the inception of the program in 1998.215 In January of 1998, 
just four respondents were confined in a TDF through the SVP 
Commitment Act.216 As of December 2016, this number has swelled to 562 
respondents.217 Nearly every month, more individuals are committed to 
TDFs under this Act. In the entirety of the SVP Commitment Act’s nearly 
eighteen-year existence, only sixteen respondents have ever been 
discharged under the Act.218 This means that the Illinois SVP Commitment 
Act has a discharge rate of just 2.8%. In contrast, forty-six respondents 
have died while at a TDF, for a death rate 8.4%.219 This means that an 
individual committed under the SVP Commitment Act is four times more 
likely to die at a TDF than to be discharged. The effects of the SVP 
Commitment Act’s jury trial provisions are even more apparent when 
examining the number of individuals who receive conditional release as 
opposed to full discharge. Remember, an individual who seeks conditional 
release does not go in front of a jury, and is only tried by a judge. Since the 
inception of the SVP Commitment Act, ninety-eight respondents have 
received conditional release, as opposed to the just sixteen respondents who 
have been released through full discharge.220 Respondents who face a 
bench trial for conditional release are more likely to prevail than 
respondents who are forced to be tried by a jury when seeking full 
discharge.
III. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL REMEDIES TO DUE PROCESS 
VIOLATIONS
Because the Illinois SVP Commitment Act has been declared 
constitutional by the Illinois Supreme Court, there are only two means to 
amend or strike down the prosecutor’s jury trial provisions that lead to due 
process violations. The first means is the legislative process. The Illinois 
SVP Commitment Act was enacted through the legislative process, and was 
passed through both houses of the Illinois General Assembly and signed 
into law by Governor Jim Edgar.221 The SVP Commitment Act can be 
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amended by the same process it was enacted. New legislation that proposes 
to amend the SVP Commitment Act could be proposed in both the Illinois 
House of Representatives and the Illinois Senate, passed by both chambers, 
and submitted to the governor for his signature.222 However, any legislation 
that is viewed as granting leniency to sex offenders is likely to be 
politically toxic, and unlikely to be passed by the Legislature and signed 
into law.223 The more likely, yet still difficult path to remedying the jury 
right provisions is through the judicial process. In the following sections, 
this Note will examine the path, and likelihood of success, in challenging 
the constitutionality of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act’s jury trial 
provisions in the legislative and judicial systems.
A. Legislative Amendments to Illinois SVP Commitment Act
The process of amending an existing law begins with the introduction 
of the bill in either the Illinois House of Representatives or the Illinois 
Senate.224 If the bill receives a majority of votes in both houses of the 
General Assembly, it is then sent to the Governor, who may choose to sign 
the bill into law or veto the bill.225 This is the process by which any 
amendment to the Illinois SVP Commitment Act would have to proceed. 
There are both positives and negatives to this approach. On the positive 
side, the Illinois SVP Act has already been amended by a bill passed 
through both Houses of the General Assembly and signed by the Governor. 
Just this past year, the Illinois General Assembly passed Public Act 99-628, 
titled “An Act concerning criminal law.”226 Public Act 99-628 made a 
number of changes to existing Illinois laws, such as the Sex Offender 
Management Board Act, Juvenile Court Act of 1987, the Rights of Crime 
Victims and Witnesses Act, and the Illinois SVP Commitment Act.227
Specifically, Public Act 99-628 amended section 15 of the SVP 
Commitment Act, which contains the requirements and contents for the 
SVP petition filed by the prosecutor.228 The amendment was a relatively 
minor one, affecting the timeline of when the SVP petition should be 
http://www.dhs.state.il.us/OneNetLibrary/27897/documents/StatePlans/HSP2009.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/45B6-XVZV].
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filed.229 Public Act 99-628 changed section 15 to read, “[t]he petition must 
be filed no more than 90 days before discharge or entry into mandatory 
supervised release from a Department of Corrections or aftercare release 
from the Department of Juvenile Justice correctional facility.”230 The 
amendment added the phrase “or aftercare release from” a Juvenile Justice 
facility.231 This is a minor change, and one that expands the class of 
individuals who can be named in a SVP petition. Public Act 99-628 
establishes that the Illinois General Assembly is at lease familiar with the 
process of passing an amendment to the Illinois SVP Commitment Act, and 
it is plausible that the jury trial provisions in the act could be remedied 
through legislative action.
The fact that the Illinois General Assembly has recently amended the 
Illinois SVP Commitment Act does not mean that the political reality 
surrounding sex offenders has at all changed. This is because, as discussed 
in previous sections of this Note, there are many politicians who play to 
their constituents’ ingrained fears of sex offenders in order to gain political 
points.232 The 2016 election cycle in Illinois featured a number of political 
advertisements in which politicians criticized their opponents for perceived 
support of sex offenders.233 The race between incumbent Democratic 
Illinois Congressman John Bradley and Republican Dave Severin for the 
seat in Illinois’s 117th District featured political ads slamming Bradley 
over perceived support for sexual predators.234 Representative Bradley was 
featured in ads supporting former Illinois Congressman Keith Farnham, 
who was later convicted of possession of child pornography.235 Severin
used Bradley’s support of a man who was convicted of a sex crime as an 
attack on Bradley’s judgment.236 On election day, Severin won the race and 
ousted Bradley from his seat.237
229. Pub. Act 99-628, sec. 25, § 15, 1997 Ill. Legis. Serv. 99-628 (West).
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This race was not the only one to feature a politician being attacked 
for perceived support of sex offenders. Sex offenders were used as 
ammunition for political attacks in the 2016 races for Illinois’s 76th, 79th, 
and 155th Congressional Districts.238 Many of these candidates’ perceived 
connections to sex offenders were tenuous at best. In the race for the 79th 
District, Republican Lindsey Parkhurst was attacked for previously 
defending a sex offender while working as a criminal defense attorney.239
In the race for the 76th District, Republican Jerry Long was attacked for 
renting a home to a convicted sex offender.240 Considering that politicians 
have been attacked, and lost races, over such lower forms of “support” of 
sex offenders as renting a home to an offender or even just knowing an 
offender, it is not hard to imagine the attacks a politician would receive if 
they were seen as supporting legislation that appeared to make it easier for 
sex offenders to be released. This is likely how amending the jury trial 
provisions of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act would be perceived. It is 
therefore highly unlikely that the legislative process offers SVP 
respondents any prospect of relief from the due process violations that 
occur from the prosecutor’s right to a jury trial.
B. Judicial Remedies to Due Process Violations of SVP Commitment 
Act
1. Illinois Judicial System
The Illinois Supreme Court declared the Illinois SVP Commitment 
Act constitutional in In re Samuelson.241 This decision certainly does not 
preclude the Illinois Supreme Court from revisiting its decision in this case, 
or from determining the constitutionality of certain provisions of the SVP 
Commitment Act. In fact, many attorneys who represent SVP respondents 
actively attempt to litigate and appeal provisions of the SVP Commitment 
Act in hopes of going before the Illinois Supreme Court. However, in terms 
of evaluating the likelihood that the Illinois Supreme Court will rule that 
the SVP Commitment Act in an unconstitutional violation of the Illinois 
Constitution, it is almost as unlikely that the Illinois Supreme Court would 
overturn the jury trial provisions as it is that Illinois legislators would 
amend these provisions. Illinois has an elected judiciary, and judges and 
238. Miller, supra note 234.
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judicial candidates are subject to many of the same political pressures that 
Illinois legislators face.
Illinois’s history of an elected judiciary predates Illinois’s own 
addition to the Union as a state.242 As Illinois’s population continued to 
grow throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, more and more 
elected judges were added, creating an unruly and highly politicized court 
structure.243 To attempt to solve this issue, Illinois adopted Article VI of its 
new constitution in 1970, which created a unified, three-tier judicial system 
in which all judges are elected in partisan elections after being nominated 
by petition or through the primary process.244 There are a number of 
concerns regarding how a system with elected judges results in rulings that 
are partial and politically motivated, especially in Illinois.245 Because
Illinois judges will at one point have to run in an election, many judges will 
avoid controversial decisions, curb their support for criminal defendants, 
and become more conservative in deciding cases in order to prevent 
political backlash.246 Much like legislators, elected judges in Illinois “are 
not immune from the impact of ‘moral panics,’ flowing from ‘the public’s 
passive acceptance of media and politician-driven images of the nature and 
extent of crime.’”247 For judges, sentences and verdicts issued in SVP cases 
have a very high salience with the public, and can lead to a great amount of 
media coverage and negative reactions from political groups and voters.248
For example, in the 2004 campaign for a seat on the Illinois Supreme 
Court, Democratic Supreme Court candidate Gordon E. Maag blasted his 
Republican opponent, Lloyd A. Karemier, for being too lenient with 
pedophiles, while Karemier accused Maag of releasing a defendant who 
tortured an elderly woman.249 Karemier ultimately prevailed in a race that 
saw between eight to ten million dollars expended by outside groups and 
donors.250 This race epitomizes the challenges of convincing the elected 
242. Mary Eileen Weicher, Mentorship Article, The Expansion of the First Amendment in Judicial 
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members of the Illinois judiciary to strike down jury trial provisions in the 
Illinois SVP Commitment Act, as any judge who rules in favor of SVP 
respondents could have his decision come back to haunt him or her in a 
political opponent’s attack ad.
2. Federal Judicial System
The fact that the U.S. Supreme Court twice validated the 
constitutionality of SVP commitment laws in Kansas v. Crane and United 
States v. Comstock initially makes the prospect of changing SVP laws 
through the federal judicial system seem daunting. First, federal prisoners 
can only be committed as SVPs if they commit a federal crime, and most 
sexually violent offenses are tried in state court.251 Second, the Supreme 
Court is usually highly deferential to its previous decisions through the 
principle of stare decisis.252 Third, the Supreme Court in recent years has 
not been viewed as particularly defendant-friendly on criminal law and its 
related issues, which would presumably include SVP Commitment laws.253
Fourth, federal courts may be unwilling to reach into the realm of state law 
and declare specific state programs unconstitutional. Despite these 
drawbacks, the federal judicial system still offers the most realistic and 
promising opportunity for SVP respondents to obtain relief from the due 
process violations of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act.
The first advantage of challenging the Illinois SVP Commitment act in 
federal court is that federal judges, unlike both Illinois judges and Illinois 
legislators, are not elected, but rather appointed.254 Federal judges are 
appointed by the president under Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution, 
and are then sent to the Senate for confirmation.255 Once the judges are 
confirmed, they receive an appointment that can only be ended by their 
death, retirement, or impeachment.256 Because federal judges do not have 
to run in elections, they are not subject to the same political pressures and 
citizen fears that elected officials and judges are. This gives federal judges 
a necessary level of insulation in making their decisions.257 Federal judges 
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do not need to fear that their decisions will be used against them in political 
ads, and as a result they can rule according to their own intellect and 
judgment, without considering political pressures.258 This partly explains 
why the acquittal rate is so much higher in federal court than in state courts, 
as federal judges need not worry about political blowback from their 
decisions.259 This protection makes federal judges perfect candidates to 
evaluate the due process claims of SVP respondents in a vacuum, without 
any of the fears, biases, and confusion that the public as a whole has 
regarding sex offenders.
The second benefit of challenging the Illinois SVP Commitment Act 
in federal court is that there is already a framework for how to prove that an 
SVP commitment program violates SVP respondents’ due process rights. 
Justice Kennedy warned in Kansas v. Hendricks that if SVP programs were 
enacted as “a sham or mere pretext” for confining individuals past the point 
where they are no longer dangerous, the program would be 
unconstitutional.260 Federal judges can use and have used Justice 
Kennedy’s words to examine SVP programs to determine if any part of the
act is being used as pretext for preventing non-dangerous offenders from 
being released. If a respondent can prove to a federal judge that the jury 
trial provisions of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act result in respondents 
being held beyond the point that they are no longer dangerous, federal 
judges could strike down the provision, or the law as a whole, and cite 
Justice Kennedy’s warning as precedent.
The Supreme Court has not yet specifically addressed the question of 
the standard of scrutiny that should be applied to SVP’s due process claims. 
The Eighth Circuit in Karsjens v. Piper believes the standard is rational 
basis scrutiny, because SVPs do not have a fundamental liberty interest at 
stake in their confinement.261 This approach has not been adopted by other 
circuit courts. However, Supreme Court precedent provides that the test for 
evaluating a challenge that involves a fundamental liberty is whether the 
means used by the government to take away someone’s liberty is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest.262
If SVP respondents are able to convince the Supreme Court that they 
do have a fundamental liberty in their right not to be confined beyond the 
point where they are dangerous, the Illinois government will carry a heavy 
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burden in overcoming strict scrutiny. Even if the government has a 
compelling interest in taking the liberty of sex offenders, under the strict 
scrutiny standard, it must be able to show that it is taking this liberty in the 
least restrictive means possible.263
The final reason why the federal judicial system offers the best chance 
for declaring sections of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act unconstitutional 
is that federal courts are in a unique position to consider the totality of a 
SVP law, and examine how effective the law has been in achieving its 
stated purpose. Illinois legislators and Illinois judges may be uncomfortable 
in declaring that an act or provision that they have enacted and ruled on 
may actually be unconstitutional. However, federal judges do not have 
these worries, as they do not personally represent the people of Illinois. 
Federal judges can also evaluate the Illinois SVP Commitment Program in 
the context of other state programs, such as that of Minnesota and 
Missouri, to judge its constitutionality. After the challenges in federal 
district court in Minnesota and Missouri resulting in concerns of the 
constitutionality of SVP laws, federal judges may feel as if there is 
momentum to truly evaluate the effectiveness of these laws and programs. 
It has now been close to twenty years since the Illinois SVP Commitment 
Act was signed into law.264 This is a significant amount of time for a 
federal judge to survey to evaluate the effectiveness and constitutionality of 
the SVP Commitment Act. With the recent decisions in Minnesota and 
Missouri, it is possible that time has not been kind to these programs, and 
that federal judges are reevaluating the constitutionality of SVP programs. 
For these reasons, a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 constitutional claim alleging that the 
jury trial provisions of the Illinois SVP Commitment Act result in detention 
past the time when a person is dangerous, in violation of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, has the best chance of 
success in federal court.
CONCLUSION
The issue of the constitutionality of SVP programs is a difficult one, 
both legally and politically. Because of the nature of sex offenders and 
sexually violent crimes, there is little to no public advocacy for the rights of 
sex offenders. Much of the public would rather risk the constitutional 
liberties of these criminals than risk that these criminals harm even one 
person after being released. Political pressures make it a near certainty that 
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politicians and elected judges in Illinois will continue to use public fear of 
sex offenders as ammunition for political attack ads. Sensationalistic media 
coverage of sex offenders and sexual crimes will likely continue, increasing 
the overall fear of sex offenders. Despite these issues, the time is right to 
challenge the Illinois SVP Commitment Act and its provisions that provide 
prosecutors with the unilateral right to a jury trial. These provisions result 
in jurors who fear sex offenders trying the commitment and discharge 
proceedings of SVP respondents. This in turn results in SVP respondents 
being committed without meeting the statutory criteria or being detained 
past the point where they are no longer dangerous. The U.S. Constitution 
guarantees that a person cannot have their liberty taken without due process 
of law. A program that forces individuals in front of a hostile jury, which 
can confine them indefinitely, while actively denying them the right to 
appear in front of judge simply does not square with Supreme Court 
precedent on due process. If every citizen is truly to be afforded the due 
process of law, no matter how horrific their crimes or personality, then 
there needs to be serious changes to the jury trial provisions in the Illinois 
SVP Commitment Act.
